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VICS (Vehicle Information and Communication System) is a digital data 
communication system which promptly provides the latest necessary road traffic 
information via car navigation equipment.   
In this paper, we first classified benefits of using VICS and showed that VICS unit is 
a good with network externality.  There are two patterns for its sign of externality; it 
can be negative or change from positive to negative. 
We then developed a simulation model based and actually measured the optimal 
penetration level of VICS and the level of tax/subsidy required to realize that level. 
The result showed that it would be highly necessary to impose a tax on VICS units in 
order to realize the optimal penetration level.     
 
1.  Introduction  
VICS (Vehicle Information and Communication System) is a digital data 
communication system which promptly provides the latest necessary road traffic 
information such as traffic congestions, accidents or link-travel-time to drivers via car 
navigation equipment. Drivers can receive real-time road traffic information about 
congestion and regulation 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. The world's first VICS service 
started in Japan in April 1996. 
Researchers from various countries have conducted a number of computer 
simulations in order to examine the extent to which such provision of traffic information 
can save travel-time of users of information and non-users.  Many studies aimed at 
measuring the impact of traffic congestions, information penetration level or quality of 
information and etc. on the travel-time, by setting hypothetical O-D pair as well as road 
network and formulating route choice behaviors both for users and non-users
i.   
Among such studies, Ben-Akiva et al.(1991), Emmerink et al.(1995), Koutsopoulos 
and Lotan(1990), Mahmassani and Jayakrishnan(1991), Yang (1999) have focused on 
the impact of traffic information penetration level on travel-time, which will be 
examined in this paper.  In these studies, various penetration levels have been 
exogenously set and the impact on travel-time for both users and non-users has been 
measured and it has been concluded that the penetration level has a large impact on 
travel-time for both users and non-users.   
As studies aiming at measuring the market penetration level of traffic information as 
the endogenous variable of model, by formulating the demand curve and the supply 
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its framework. Yang (1998), Yang (1999), Yang and Meng (2001), Yin and Yang 
(2003) have then conducted its actual modeling.     
In Yang (1998), it has been indicated that service users deterministically travel along 
the shortest route to their destination based on the traffic information provided, while 
non-users stochastically choose travel routes based on the logit choice.    The benefit for 
users is the margin between the travel-time of users and that of non-users and the 
demand curve for traffic information has been formulated as a logit model whose 
explanatory variable is the margin of travel-time.    Yang and Meng (2001) has modified 
this model to a dynamic model and Yin and Yang (2003) has extended its research 
targets to cases where users choose their routes by considering the quality of 
information. 
On the other hand, Emmerink et al.(1996) and Zang and Verhoef (2005) have argued 
about the traffic information in terms of economic welfare.  Zang and Verhoef (2005) 
employed a model which has been developed from the model studied in Emmerink et al. 
(1996).  In their study, benefits of traffic information have been classified into two 
categories of benefits, which are the decision-making benefit and the travel-time saving 
benefit (the decision-making benefit is the benefit which drivers can enjoy when he/she 
can obtain complete information on traffic congestion ahead of travel and can thus make 
an appropriate decision in deciding to travel or not.  The travel cost benefit is the 
benefit of reduction of travel-time) and the demand curve for information has been 
derived under the assumption that the former being benefits belong to users.   
Meanwhile, the supply curve for information has been derived under the assumption 
that the information is provided by a monopoly firm.  The information penetration 
level has been calculated as the point at the intersection of the demand curve and the 
supply curve.  Based on that, they have calculated the economic welfare level 
(decision-making benefit and travel-time saving benefit) and analyzed the impact of the 
provision of subsidies to the monopoly firm on the economic welfare.       
As explained above, there have been several researches on the penetration level of 
traffic information.    However, the penetration level analyzed in researches above is the 
purchase rate of the traffic information on specific route, under the assumption that 
traffic information on certain O-D pairs and road networks are onerously provided by a 
private company.   
In this paper, we will discuss about the optimal penetration level of VICS in terms of 
economic welfare as discussed in Emmerink et al. (1996) and Zang and Verhoef (2005).   
However, our focus will be put on the penetration level of VICS-enabled car navigation 
system to receive traffic information from VICS (hereinafter, ‘VICS unit’).  It is 
because, as explained below, if a driver purchased a VICS unit, he or she will be able to 
receive traffic information for free and there is no point to consider the problem of 
penetration levels for individual routes.  In analyzing the penetration level of VICS 
unit, two points of view, which are different from those in previous studies, will be 
important. The first point is the network externality that VICS unit has and the second is 
the problem of dynamic stability of penetration level, attributed to its network 
externality.   
 2In this paper, we will first classify benefits of using VICS and show that the VICS 
unit is a good with network externality and there are two patterns for its sign of 
externality, which are negative or positive to negative. 
We will then develop a simulation model and calculate the optimal penetration level 
and the amount of taxes and subsidies required to accomplish that standard.     
 
2.  Outline of VICS and benefits from VICS   
In this section, we will review the outline of VICS and characteristics of benefits of 
this service.   
 
2.1.  Outline of VICS service 
As explained above, VICS (Vehicle Information and Communication System) is a 
system to provide traffic information such as traffic jams, accidents or link-travel-time 
to drivers in real time, through on-board car navigation system.  Information will be 
displayed on the map of the car navigation screen, as overwriting.  This system is 
managed by VICS center, which has been jointly established by National Police Agency, 
Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications, Ministry of Construction and private firms 
in 1995.  Its service started in 1996, first in the metropolitan area.  Its service has 
been gradually extended to other areas and the service has been provided throughout 
Japan since February 2003.     
There are three methods for providing traffic information edited and processed in 
VICS center; 1) information transmission through radio beacons, devices installed on 
highways, 2) information transmission through infrared beacons, devices on major open 
roads and 3) FM multiplex broadcasting by FM  stations.  Among  them,  information  on 
traffic jams and travel-time on open roads is provided through infrared beacons and FM 
multiplex broadcasting.  While the latter provides wide-area information covering the 
whole prefectural area where the FM station concerned is located, infrared beacons can 
provide high-precision information as far as 30 km ahead and 1 km behind from the car.     
VICS unit needs to be installed in order to receive traffic information by VICS.  
Two types of VICS units are currently sold on the open market.    One receives only FM 
multiplex broadcasting and the other can receive information from beacons 
(radio/optical) all together (this kind of device is called ‘three-media-receiver’).   
Traffic information for VICS is collected through devices installed on roads, such as 
vehicle detectors.    It should be noted that the infrared beacon explained above not only 
has the function to transmit information to VICS units but also has the function as 
vehicle detector.  The characteristic of the infrared beacon is that it can identify 
individual vehicles by receiving information on ID numbers from vehicles equipped 
with three-media-receiver, while other vehicle detectors, such as ultrasonic vehicle 
detectors and microwave vehicle detectors, merely detect every vehicle and its speed 
cross-sectionally.  It will be thus possible for the infrared beacon to provide 
information with higher-precision on link-travel-time, as it can calculate the time 
required to travel between one infrared beacon and the next one.       
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315 yen (consumption tax of 15 yen included) as reception fee.    Apart from that, users 
do not need to pay additional charges to use VICS.   
 
2.2 Benefits  from  VICS and its feature 
We will now explain about benefits which will be brought to the society by using 
VICS.  
 
2.2.1  Categories of benefits and their attributions 
Benefits of VICS will be categorized into two benefits, which are benefits belonging 
to drivers and benefits of environment improvement.   
Among benefits belonging to drivers, the travel-time saving benefit, which can be 
realized by avoiding traffic congestions temporally and spatially, is the most important.   
In the same time, when the traveling speed has been increased by avoiding traffic 
congestions, we can also have benefits of energy reduction (Travel cost saving benefits).   
Such benefits can be enjoyed not only by vehicles equipped with VICS unit but also 
by vehicles without VICS unit, as traffic congestions that vehicles without VICS suffer 
will be relieved when vehicles equipped with VICS unit disperse their travel time and 
routes.  In  addition,  there  will be also the decision-making benefit for vehicles 
equipped with VICS unit, that will allow drivers to make an appropriate decision in 
deciding to travel or not. 
Concerning to benefits of environment improvement, there are two types of benefits, 
which are the benefit of reducing air-pollution substances such as NOX or PM and the 
benefit of reducing emissions of carbon.  The former means the decrease of health 
damages of city populations residing along major roads or the reduction of acid rain. 
The latter means the prevention of global warming. 
 
2.2.2  Feature of travel-time saving benefits 
We will then clarify the feature of VICS benefits, focusing on its travel-time saving 
benefits.  
 
a)  Relation between the penetration level and the travel-time saving rate 
As explained above, many studies have been done as to the relation between the 
penetration level of traffic information and the travel-time saving rate for information 
users and non-users.    Here, we will study the relation between the penetration level and 
the travel-time saving rate in two cases as in Figure 1 and Figure 2, in accordance with 
Emmerink et al. (1994).     
Concerning non-users, both in Figure 1 and Figure 2, the travel-time saving rate 
increases, as the penetration level of traffic information  increases.  This  is  because  the 
traffic will be temporally and spatially dispersed as the number of information users 
increases, and traffic congestions on routes or hours that non-users choose will be 
gradually  relieved.   
Regarding information users, in Figure 1, the travel-time saving rate decreases as the 
penetration  level  increases.  Let’s  throw  a  short look at an example where there are two 
 4routes, A and B, to travel from a departure point to a destination and the route A is more 
congested than the route B.  In such case, information users will choose the route B, 
based on traffic information.  However, the number of vehicles choosing the route B 
will be more numerous as the number of information users increases.  As a result, the 
route B will be gradually congested.  The maximum travel-time saving rate for 
information users will be thus realized when the number of other users is zero and the 
travel-time saving rate will decrease as the number of information users increases.  
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Figure 1 Relation between the penetration level and the travel-time saving rate (1) 
 
On the other hand, in the case in Figure 2, the slope of the curve for the travel-time 
saving rate for information users turns from positive to negative at the penetration 
level . This will occur when traffic information is collected through on-board devices.   
It is because, when the penetration level of on-board device remains low, traffic 
information will more precise when the penetration level of device augments and 
information from on-board devices increases.    However, when the penetration level 
became higher than the boundary penetration level, further increase in number of users 
will have an effect to cause traffic congestions on alternative routes, rather than the 
improvement of precision of traffic information.    It is thus considered that, in such case, 
the travel-time saving level for information users will decrease, as the penetration level 
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Figure 2 Relation between the penetration level and the travel-time saving rate（2）  
 
For the relation between the penetration level of VICS and the travel-time saving rate, 
these will be also two cases as in Figure 1 and Figure 2. 
ii.  
As explained above, in VICS, infrared beacons estimate precise travel-time by uplink 
information from three-media-receiver VICS units.   
With regard to this link-travel-time, as the number of three-media-receiver VICS 
units increase, it will be possible to collect more information covering wide areas and 
traffic information by VICS will be thus more precise.   If infrared beacon contributes 
the most to the reduction of travel-time among three VICS Medias, the relation between 
the penetration level of VICS unit and the travel-time saving rate will be generally 
indicated like in Figure 2.   
On the other hand, 70-80% of VICS currently used are said to be one-media-receiver 
VICS, which receive only FM multiplex broadcasting.    In that case, the contribution of 
infrared beacons to the reduction of travel-time will not be that important and it will be 
highly possible that relation between the penetration level of VICS unit and the 
travel-time saving rate will be generally indicated like Figure 1.   
 
b)  Classification of travel-time saving benefits based on attributions 
We will then classify travel-time saving benefits by VICS, based on their attributions. 
Figure 3 classified travel-time saving benefits under the assumption that the relation 
between the penetration level of VICS and the travel-time saving rate is as in Figure 1.  
Fist of all, two heavy-line curves in Figure 3 show the travel-time saving benefit for one 
vehicle equipped with VICS unit compared to the penetration level of 0% and the 
travel-time saving benefit for one vehicle without VICS unit.  In order to simplify the 
discussion, travel-time and time value is set as equal for all drivers.  The travel time 
saving rate for vehicles equipped with VICS unit decreases as the penetration level 
increases.  Therefore, the travel-time saving benefit for one vehicle equipped with 
 6VICS unit will gradually decrease.    On the other hand, as the travel time saving rate for 
vehicles without VICS unit increases as the penetration level increases, the travel-time 
saving benefit for one vehicle without VICS unit will gradually increase. 
The travel-time saving benefits for the society at the penetration level of   will be 
classified into 3 categories; 2 benefits belonging to vehicles equipped with VICS unit 
(
p
Figure 3: ‘(i)Benefit for vehicles equipped with VICS, which will be evaluated in the 
market’, ‘(ii)Benefit for vehicles equipped with VICS, which will not evaluated in the 
market’) and 1 benefit belonging to vehicles without VICS unit (Figure 3:‘(iii)Benefit 
for vehicles without VICS unit’).     
Firstly, concerning the benefits belonging to vehicles equipped with VICS unit, the 
total amount is equal to the product of the travel-time saving benefit for one vehicle 
equipped with VICS unit compared to the penetration level of 0%, the penetration level 
and the number of vehicles in the whole society.  This benefit is composed of two 
categories of benefits, which are 1) the benefit which will be a subject of market's 
evaluation and 2) the benefit which will not be subjected to the market’s evaluation.  
‘(i)Benefit for vehicles equipped with VICS, which will be evaluated in the market’ will 
be indicated as the product of the margin between the travel-time saving benefit for one 
vehicle equipped with VICS unit and that for one vehicle without VICS, the penetration 
level and the number of vehicles in the whole society.  It is because the market value 
of VICS unit is assessed by the travel-time saved by vehicles equipped with VICS in 
comparison with that of vehicles without VICS and it will not be assessed by the margin 
compared to the penetration level of 0%.    As the relation between the penetration level 
of VICS and the travel-time saving rate is assumed as Figure 1, the margin between the 
benefit for a vehicle with VICS and one without VICS will decrease in a monotone and 
the margin attains its maximum level when the penetration level is zero and the margin 
became zero when the penetration level is 100%.    However, if the relation between the 
penetration level of VICS and the travel-time saving rate is assumed as Figure 2, the 
margin between the benefit for one vehicle equipped with VICS and that of one vehicle 
without VICS will increase up to a certain penetration level (boundary penetration level) 
and will then decrease in a monotone and the margin will became zero when the 
penetration level is 100%.     
Secondly, among benefits belonging to vehicles with VICS unit, ‘(ii)Benefit for 
vehicles equipped with VICS, which will not evaluated in the market’ will be indicated 
as the product of the travel-time saving benefit for one vehicle without VICS unit 
compared to the penetration level of 0%, the penetration level and the number of 
vehicles in the whole society.  It is because vehicles equipped with VICS unit can 
enjoy not only the benefit in (i) but also travel-time saving benefits that vehicles without 
VICS enjoy.    This benefit increases in a monotone as the penetration level augments.   
Finally, as to‘(iii) Benefit for vehicles without VICS unit’, this is equal to the product 
of the travel-time saving benefit for one vehicle without VICS unit compared to the 
penetration level of 0% , (1-penetration level) and the number of vehicles in the whole 
society. 
As discussed above, travel-time saving benefits for the society by VICS can be 
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Figure 3    Penetration level of VICS and travel-time saving benefits 
 
c)  Travel-time saving benefits and network externality 
When the benefit that individuals can enjoy from a good or a service depends on the 
number of individuals consuming the good or service, the good or service concerned has 
network externality
iii.  The network externality is a notion used normally when the 
sign of externality is positive, c'est-a-dire, when the benefit that individuals can enjoy 
from a good or a service increases as the number of individuals consuming the good or 
service augments.    However, in this paper, we will use this notion regardless of its sign 
of  externality.   
Among benefits belonging to vehicles equipped with VICS, the first benefit, that is, 
‘(i)Benefit for vehicles equipped with VICS, which will be evaluated in the market’ is 
the benefit related to the network externality of VICS unit.    If the relation as in Figure 
1 can be established between the penetration level of VICS init and the travel-time 
saving rate, the benefit by VICS evaluated in the market (margin between the 
travel-time saving benefit for one vehicle equipped with VICS unit and that for one 
vehicle without VICS) will decrease in a monotone as the penetration level increases.  
In such case, VICS unit is a good with network externality whose sign of externality is 
negative.  In contrast, if the relation as in Figure 2 can be established between the 
penetration level of VICS and the travel-time saving rate, the benefit by VICS evaluated 
in the market (margin between the travel-time saving benefit for one vehicle equipped 
with VICS unit and that for one vehicle without VICS) will increase up to the boundary 
penetration level and will then decrease in a monotone and it will became zero when the 
penetration level attaints 100%.  In such case, VICS unit is a good with network 
externality whose sign of externality turns from positive to negative at the boundary 
penetration level. 
 8In ‘3 Simulation of the optimal penetration level of VICS and the level of tax/subsidy’, 
we will run a simulation on the penetration level of VICS unit and the travel-time 
saving rate based on the pattern in Figure 1, assuming the sign of externality is negative. 
 
3.  Simulation of optimal penetration level of VICS and the level of 
tax/subsidy 
In this section, we will simulate how benefits of VICS, the market penetration level, 
the optimal penetration level and the tax/subsidy rate required to realize the optimal 
penetration level change, depending on travel-time saving effects of VICS.    First of all, 
we will explain about the framework of the simulation model.   
  
3.1 Simulation  model 
3.1.1 Framework 
a)  Target benefits of simulation 
Among benefits explained in the section 2 ‘Outline of VICS and benefits from VICS 
and its feature’, the travel-time saving benefit enjoyed by both of vehicles equipped 
with VICS unit and vehicles without VICS unit will be the object of this simulation.   
 
b)  Types of vehicle 
We have categorized vehicles into 4 types, which are passenger vehicles, mini trucks, 
small trucks and standard trucks, and set different travel distance distributions and time 
values for each category of vehicle to calculate the travel-time saving benefit.  In 
principle, we have referred to the Japanese statistical data of 2002 and 2003 in setting 
travel distance distributions and times values.   
 
c)  Relation between the penetration level of VICS init and the travel-time 
saving rate 
We assume that the reduction of travel-time would be realized only when vehicles 
equipped with VICS unit drive on the general roads of urban areas
iv, and it would not be 
realize in other areas.  As to the relation between the penetration level of VICS unit 
and the travel-time saving rate, under the assumption that the sign of externality is 
negative as in Figure 1, we have set several values for α and β as well as for curvatures 
to conduct our simulation.    It should be noted that the travel-time saving rate in Figure 
1 shows the expected value of travel-time saving and the actual travel-time saving rate 
will be distributed stochastically.   
 
d)  Decision making in purchasing the VICS unit 
We assume that each individual has complete information on the relation between the 
penetration level of VICS unit and the expected value of travel-time saving and 
purchases a VICS unit when the expected value of personal benefit by the vehicle 
equipped with VICS (‘Benefit for vehicles equipped with VICS, which will be 
evaluated in the market’ in Figure 3) exceeds the cost of purchasing a VICS unit.   
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As VICS reduces the generalized cost of travel, it can be reasonably considered that 
the penetration of VICS increases the traffic volume.  In this paper, however, in order 
to simplify the model, we will conduct a simulation under the assumption that VICS 
does not affect the traffic volume.     
 
3.1.2. Model   
The simulation model and values of parameters are as follows.   
 
a)  Distribution of travel-time costs in urban areas 
We assume that the distribution of travel-time costs in urban areas of vehicles j
（ j ∈{c , , l s , }  ：passenger vehicles,l：mini trucks, b c s ：small-sized trucks,b：
standard trucks）are lognormally-distributed as follows.   
 
Passenger vehicles 
We assume that the travel distance of a passenger vehicle ( j= ) and the time value 
of an individual are independent and lognormally-distributed.    Under this assumption, 
the travel-time cost of passenger vehicle in urban is lognormally-distributed as below. 
c
 




















   
c x μ =
c d, η ＋ln c λ -ln + v
c w, η  
c d, η ：Calculated from the national average and median of monthly travel 
distance
v , under the assumption that monthly travel distance is 
lognormally-distributed. 
c λ ：National average of the percentage of travel on general roads of urban 
areas in the whole travel distance
vi.  
v ：The average traveling speed on general roads in urban areas
vii.   
c w, η ：Calculated from the national average and median of time value under 
the assumption that the time value is lognormally-distributed.    We have 
calculated the average and the median of time value based on the 
distribution of annual income
viii and the average annual working hours
ix 
across  the  country.   
 
c x σ =
i c d, σ + c w, σ  
i c d, σ ：Calculated from the national average and median of monthly travel 
distance, as 
c d, η .  
c w, σ ：Calculated from the national average and median of time value, as 
c w, η . 
 
 10Table 1  Values used for the calculation of parameters of the 
distribution of travel-time costs for passenger vehicles. 
c x μ  
c d, η  
c w, η   c λ   v   c x σ  
i c d, σ   c w, σ  
9.725 5.659 8.033 0.423  22.343 1.422 0.909 0.513 
 
 
Mini trucks, small trucks and standard trucks 
We assume that the travel distance of each truck ( j ∈ { , l s , }) is 
lognormally-distributed. Under this assumption, the travel-time cost in urban areas 
follows a lognormal distribution as below. While we have assumed that the time value 
is lognormally distributed for passenger vehicles, we set a certain time value for each 
type of truck.   
b


















−   j ∈{l,s ,b}･････(2) 
   
j x μ =
j η ＋ln j λ - +   ln v ln j w
j η ：Calculated from the national average and median of monthly travel 
distance
x, under the assumption that the monthly travel distance for 
vehicle  j is  lognormally-distributed. 
j λ ：National average of the percentage of travel on general roads of urban 
areas in the whole travel distance which is assumed to be common to 
each vehicle type. 
v ：Traveling speed.    (Same of passenger vehicles)   
j w ：Time value.    We have employed the value in ‘Cost-Benefit Analysis 
Manual’ by Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport
xi, under the 
assumption that the time value is common for all vehicles of the same 
type.  
j x σ ：Calculated from the national average and median of monthly travel 
distance for vehicle j, as 
j η .  
 
Table 2    Values used for the calculation of parameters of the 
distribution of travel-time costs for trucks 
Type of vehicle  j x μ  
j η   j λ   v   j w  
j x σ  
Mini truck ( j= )  l 10.219 6.166 0.377 22.343 3,409 1.233
Small truck ( j=s )  10.782 6.729 0.377 22.343 3,409 1.023
Standard truck 
( j= )  b
12.638 8.183 0.367 22.343 5,246 0.339
 
 
 11b)  The travel-time saving rate 
We have formulated the expected value of the travel-time saving rate for vehicles 
equipped with VICS unit  ( ) as a following quadric.    with rt p
with rt ( ) =2( p α -β )(1-2 with θ ) +(
2 p β -α )(1-4 with θ ) - p α ：α >β ……(3) 
Under this formulation, the travel-time will be reduced by 100α % at the penetration 
level 0, 100(α -(α -β ) with θ )% at the penetration level 0.5 and 100β % at the penetration 
level 1.   
On the other hand, we have formulated the expected value of the travel-time saving 
rate for vehicles without VICS unit  ( ) as below.    without rt p
without rt ( )=2 p β (2 without θ -1) +
2 p β (1-4 without θ ) ……(4)  p
Under this formulation, the travel-time will not be reduced at the penetration level 0 
but will be reduced by 100β without θ % at the penetration level 0.5 and 100β % at the 
penetration level 1 (the same rate as vehicles with VICS).   
with θ  and  without θ  are parameters which respectively determine the curvatures of 
( ) and  ( ).  Here, we set a standard case where  ( ) and 
( ) became liner and 8 other cases for comparison.  
with rt p without rt p with rt p
without rt p Table 3 shows values of 
with θ  and  without θ   for the standard case as well as for comparative cases.    In the interval 
of 0 1,  ( ) will be a monotonically increasing function and  ( ) will 
be a monotonically decreasing function for all cases.     
≤ p ≤ with rt p without rt p
 
Table 3  Values of  with θ  and  without θ   for the standard case and comparative cases 
Value of  with θ  for  ( )  with rt p  









Standard case  Comparative 
case1 
Value of 
without θ for 







Note: Concave means the concave function to the original point and Convex means the 
convex function to the original point.   
 
c) Benefit  for  vehicles equipped with VICS 
 
Personal benefit for vehicles equipped with VICS 
The expected value of personal benefit for vehicles equipped with VICS unit at the 
penetration level (‘(i)Benefit for vehicles equipped with VICS unit, which will be 
evaluated in the market’ in 
p
Figure 3）can be indicated as the product of the margin 
between the travel-time saving rate for vehicles with VICS unit and that of vehicles 
without VICS unit and the travel-time cost.   
with j ben , ( , )= ( ( )- ( ))   p j x j x without rt p with rt p j ∈{ , , c l s , }……(5)  b
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Expectation equilibrium demand curve 
Under a given penetration level , the expected value of marginal personal benefit for 
vehicles equipped with VICS unit is common among vehicles of all types.   From the 
formula (5), it means that, under a given penetration level , the marginal travel-time 
cost for vehicles equipped with VICS units is common among vehicles of all types.    If 
the travel-time cost is 
p
p









LD  satisfies  the  following  formula.   








j d ( ) - =0   j x j dx p j ∈{ , , c l s , }……(6)  b
Where,n ＝∑
j
j n  
If we assume that the formula (6) defines implicitly the function
* x = ( ), the height 
of expectation equilibrium demand curve 
h p
LD at the penetration level can be indicated 
as the function of the penetration level as below.   
p
p
LD ( )＝ ( , p with c ben , p
* x )   ) (
* |
p h x =
   ＝ ( , with l ben , p
* x )   ) (
* |
p h x =
   ＝ ( , with s ben , p
* x )   ) (
* |
p h x =
           ＝ ( , with b ben , p
* x ) ……(7)  ) (
* |
p h x =
However, in this model, we cannot solve for 
* x = ( ) algebraically from the 
formula (6).  We have thus solved for 
h p
* x  with Newton method, by exogenously 
setting the value of   in the formula (6) and we have derived the height of the 
expectation equilibrium demand curve 
p
LD at the penetration level , by putting and 
corresponding value of 
p p
* x   in the formula (5).     
The number of vehicles  j n   used in the simulation is as in Table 4
xii.  
 
Table 4  Number of vehicles for each type   
Types of vehicle  Number j n  
Passenger vehicle j=   c 55,288,124 
Mini truck j=l  9,600,918 
Small truck j=s   4,804,780 
Standard truck j=    b 2,471,301 
Source: Numbers of motor vehicles owned, in Information and Research Department, 
Policy Bureau, Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and transport, ‘Statistical Survey on 
Motor Vehicle Transport (2003)’ 
 
Benefits for the whole vehicles equipped with VICS unit 
We can consider that the probability distribution of the margin between the 
travel-time saving rate for vehicles with VICS unit and that for vehicles without VICS 
unit ( ( )- ( )) and the probability distribution of the travel-time cost for  without rt p with rt p
 13each type of vehicle are independent.  Therefore, the benefit enjoyed by the whole 
vehicles of each type   is equal to the definite integration, from the marginal 
travel-time cost for vehicles equipped with VICS unit (numeric solution of the formula 
(6)) to the distance ∞, of the formula multiplying the expected value of personal benefit 
for each type of vehicle formulated as (5) by the probability density function of 
travel-time cost of each type of vehicle in formulas (1) and (2) and the number of 
vehicles of each type 
with j sben ,
j n .    The benefit for the whole vehicles equipped with VICS unit 
is the total of benefits of 4 vehicle types and will be indicated as below.   
with sben ( , p
* x )=∑
j






with j ben , ( , ) ( ) ..(8)  p j x j d j x j dx
 
Likewise, the marginal benefit enjoyed by the whole vehicles when the number of 
vehicles was increased by one  （ with msben MEB  curve）will be indicated as follows.     
with msben ( , p















with j sben , ( , p
* x ))…… (9) 
Where,  ＝ p F
p ∂
∂
F ( , p
* x )、 ＝ * x F * x ∂
∂
F ( , p
* x ) 
We have derived values of formulas (8) and (9) by solving for 
* x  with Newton 
method, by exogenously setting the value of    in the formula (6) and by putting and 
corresponding value of 
p p
* x   in formulas (8) and (9).   
 
Dynamic stability   
When every individual decides on whether he or she uses VICS unit or not every 
term and there is a discrepancy between the penetration level expected by peoples and 
the actual penetration level, whether the penetration level converges to a point on the 
expectation equilibrium demand curve  LD   depends on the slope of phase diagram.   
We assume that peoples estimate a common penetration level    for VICS unit.    If 
we indicate the supply price including tax/subsidy (market price of VICS unit) as  , 
the travel-time cost 
e p
' c
' x  for marginal VICS unit users under this expected penetration 
level (common level for all types of vehicle) satisfies the following formula.   
G( ,
e p
' x )＝ ( , with c ben ,
e p
' x )- ＝0…… (10) 
' c
 
If we assume that the formula (10) defines implicitly the function
' x = ( ), the 
penetration level realized can be indicated as the function of the expected penetration 






' x ) ＝ ) (






j d ( ) …… (11)  j x j dx ) (
' | e p l x =
 
Then, if we assume that peoples consider the penetration level of the previous term as 
the expected penetration level of the present term ( = ), the slope of phase diagram 
can be indicated, as the function of the penetration level in the previous term, as below.   
e p 1 − p









' x )   = …… (12)  ) (
' | e p l x =
e p 1 − p
 
We have derived values of formulas (11) and (12) by exogenously setting the value of 
 in the formula (10) and by putting its numeric solution 
e p ' x  in formulas (11) and 
(12).  
 
d)  Benefits commonly enjoyed both of vehicles equipped with VICS unit and 
vehicles without VICS unit 
At the penetration level  , the expected value of the travel-time saving benefit 
commonly enjoyed by vehicles equipped with VICS and vehicles without VICS  
(‘(ii)Benefit for vehicles equipped with VICS, which will not evaluated in the market’ 
and ‘(iii)Benefit for vehicles without VICS unit’ in 
p
Figure 3) is - ( ).  j x without rt p
We can consider that the probability distribution of the travel-time saving level for 
vehicles without VICS unit and the probability distribution of the travel-time cost for 
each type of vehicle are independent.  Therefore, the benefit enjoyed by the whole 
vehicles of each type    is equal to the definite integration from 0 to ∞, of the 
formula multiplying the expected value of this benefit by the probability density 
function of travel-time cost of each type of vehicles in formulas (3) and (4) and the 
number of vehicles of each type
together j sben ,
j n .  The whole benefit  is the total of 
benefits of 4 types of vehicle and it will be indicated as below.   
together sben
 
together sben ( )＝ p ∑
j
together j sben , ( )＝- p ∑
j
j n without rt ( ) ( ) …… (13)  p ∫
∞
0
j x j d j x j dx
Likewise, the marginal benefit enjoyed by the whole vehicles when the number of 
vehicles was increased by one    is as follows.    together msben





together sben ( )……(14)  p
 
e)  Social benefit and marginal social benefit 
The social benefit is the total of the benefit for the whole vehicles equipped 
with VICS unit (the formula (8)) and the benefit commonly enjoyed by vehicles 
equipped with VICS unit and vehicles without VICS unit (the formula (13)).    It will be 
thus indicated as below.   
sumben
sumben ( , p
* x )= ( , with sben p
* x )+ ( )…… (15)  together sben p
On the other hand, the marginal social benefit  （  curve）can be 
indicated as below, from formulas (9) and (14) .     
msumben MSB
 
msumben ( , p
* x )= ( , with msben p




 15f)  Social marginal cost 
Finally, concerning the social marginal cost, as mentioned above, in the case of VICS, 
costs for users are limited to the cost for purchasing a VICS unit and the reception fee of 
315 yen (consumption tax of 15 yen included). Apart from that, users do not need to pay 
additional charges to use VICS.   
If we assume that the cost for a VICS unit, including the reception fee, is 200,000 yen 
and the tenure of use is 10.99 years
xiii, its monthly usage fee will be 1,519 yen.    In this 
paper, we use this value as the social marginal cost, under the assumption of constant 
returns to scale.   
 
3.2.  Result of Simulation   
In the method explained above, we have simulated how benefits by VICS, the market 
penetration level and the optimal penetration level, as well as the rate of tax/subsidy 
required to realize the optimal penetration level change.  Here, we will explain about 
the result of the standard case (case where both  ( ) and  ( ) are liner), 
unless otherwise defined.   
with rt p without rt p
 
3.2.1 Expectation equilibrium demand curve of VICS, marginal benefit for the 
whole vehicles with VICS and social marginal benefit 
First of all, in order to confirm forms and the positional relation of the expectation 
equilibrium demand curve  LD , the marginal benefit for the whole vehicles MEB  and 
the social marginal benefit curve , we have drown their curves by setting 
parameters of the travel-time saving rate（
MSB
α , β ）as (0.1,0.05).  The result is as 
indicated in Figure 4
xiv. 
The intersecting point of the social marginal cost and the social marginal benefit 
curve   is the optimal penetration level.    In this case, the optimal penetration level 
is realized when the penetration level is 28.86%
MSB
xv.    However, at this penetration level, 
the expectation equilibrium demand curve  LD is situated over the social marginal 
benefit curve . It shows that the market penetration level exceeds the optimal 
penetration level.    In order to realize the penetration level of 28.86% in the market, the 
user cost must be 3,383 yen.  Therefore, in order to realize the optimal penetration 
level, we have to impose a tax of 1,864 yen, which is equivalent to the gap between 
3,383 yen and the social marginal cost (1,519yen), to every VICS unit.   
MSW



















（100α ＝10％、100β =5%） 
Figure 4   Expectation equilibrium demand curve LD , marginal benefit for the 
whole vehicles and social marginal benefit 
 
3.2.2  Combination of the travel-time saving rate, the optimal penetration level, 
the market penetration level, the level of tax/subsidy 
Secondly, we have set several parameters of travel-time saving rate (α ,β ) and 
calculated the optimal penetration level and the market penetration level.    The result is 
as indicated in Figure 5.  Four  thin  lines  in  Figure 5 shows how the market penetration 
level changes in combination with the value ofβ , in four cases where values of  α  are 
respectively set as 0.05, 0.10, 0.15 and 0.20
xvi.  On the other hand, four heavy lines 
shows how the optimal penetration level changes in combination with the value ofβ , 
also where values of  α   are 0.05, 0.10, 0.15 and 0.20
xvii.   
First of all, with regard to the market penetration level, larger the value of  α  is, 
higher the market penetration level becomes.    It is because the expectation equilibrium 
demand curve  LD  shifts to the right side as the value of  α  gets larger.  However, 
the market penetration level will not be affected byβ , because, in the standard case, the 
margin between the travel-time saving rate for vehicles equipped with VICS unit and 
that of vehicles without VICS unit is neutral to the value of  β .    We can see such cases 
where the market penetration level is neutral to  β  in comparative cases 5 and 8.  On 
the other hand, in comparative cases 2, 3 and 7, the market penetration level decreases 
 17as  β augments and in comparative cases 1, 4 and 6, the market penetration level 
increases as β  augments.   
Secondly, concerning the optimal penetration level, like the market penetration level, 
for the sameα , larger the value ofβ , higher it becomes.  It is because the effect of 
negative network externality weakens and the degree of the negative slope of the 
marginal benefit for the whole vehicles with VICS MEB   becomes smaller, as the value 
of  β  gets larger.   In addition, benefits commonly enjoyed by vehicles with VICS 
unit and vehicles without VICS unit (‘(ii)Benefit for vehicles equipped with VICS, 
which will not evaluated in the market’ and ‘(iii)Benefit for vehicles without VICS unit’ 
in  Figure 3) become larger.  However, unlike the market penetration level, for the 
sameβ , the optimal penetration level decreases as the value of α  augments.  It is 
because as the gap between  α  and β  becomes larger, the effect of negative network 
externality of VICS increases and the degree of the negative slope of the marginal 
benefit for the whole vehicles with VICS becomes larger.     
Thirdly, as to the relation between the market penetration level and the optimal 
penetration level, when we indicate points where the market penetration level and the 
optimal penetration level are identical as (α , β , ), their values are respectively 
(0.05,0.0414、0.3074), (0.10,0.090,0.4331), (0.15,0.1393, 0.5059) and (0.20,0.1888, 
0.5554).  If the value of 
p
β  exceeds these levels at each level of α, the optimal 
penetration level will exceed the market penetration level and we have to provide the 
subsidy to VICS unit in order to realize the optimal penetration level.  In contrary, if 
the value of  β  is below these levels at each level of α, the optimal penetration level 
will be below the market penetration level, and we have to impose a tax to VICS unit in 
order to realize the optimal penetration level.   
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Note: Thin lines show the market penetration levels under parameters of travel-time 
saving level (α ,β ).    On the other hand, heavy lines show the optimal penetration 
levels under parameters of travel-time saving level (α ,β ). 
Figure 5 Combination of travel-time saving rate, the optimal penetration level, the 
market penetration level, the level of tax/subsidy 
 
Figure 6 shows the level of tax/subsidy required to realize the optimal penetration level 
in combination with the value ofβ , in four cases where values of  α  are respectively 
set as 0.05, 0.10, 0.15 and 0.20.  The positive domain of vertical line shows the 
imposition of tax and the negative domain shows the provision of subsidy.  From this 
figure, we can understand that the imposition of tax is necessary to realize the optimal 
penetration level unless the value of  β  is similar to the value of  α (in other words, 
unless the negative network externality is weak).     














0.0414 0.09 0.1393 0.1888
 
Figure 6      Combination of travel-time saving rate and tax/subsidy required to 
realize the optimal penetration level(1) 
 
Furthermore, we have calculated values of  β , with which the market penetration 
level and the optimal penetration level become equal, for 37 values ofα , varying from 
the minimum value of 0.02 to the maximum value of 0.20 with an interval of 0.005.  
The heavy line in Figure 7 was drawn by connecting such points with a straight line.  
On the other hand, the thin line in Figure 7 is a forty-five degree line, i.e., combinations 
of  α  and β  whereα  and β  are equal and the network externality becomes zero.  
In the domain below the heavy line, the imposition of tax is necessary to realize the 
optimal penetration level and in the area between the heave line and the thin line, the 
provision of subsidy will be required to realize the optimal penetration level.  As in 
Figure 6, we can understand that the imposition of tax will be necessary to realize the 
optimal penetration level unless the value of  β   is similar to the value of  α (i.e., unless 
the negative network externality is weak).     
If we change points of view, combinations of α  and β  on the heavy line are 
combinations of α  and β  where the effect of the negative network externality to 
depress the marginal benefit for the whole vehicles with VICS unit （the gap between the 
marginal benefit for the whole vehicles with VICS  MEB  and the expectation 
equilibrium demand curve  LD ）   and the marginal value of benefits commonly enjoyed 
by vehicles equipped with VICS units and vehicles without VICS unit（the gap between 
the social marginal benefit curve  and the marginal benefit for the whole vehicles 
with VICS 
MSB
MEB ）are equal. 
 
 20In this simulation, we have not measured the benefit of car navigation system 
belonging to vehicles equipped with VICS unit.  However, this benefit does not have 
network externality.  If we assume that a driver gives greater values to the car 
navigation system when the personal benefit calculated in this paper is larger, even if we 
includes the benefit of car navigation system, there will be no change in the gap 
between the marginal benefit for the whole vehicles with VICS  MEB  and the 
expectation equilibrium demand curve  LD , as well as in the gap between the marginal 
benefit for the whole vehicles with VICS  MEB  and the social marginal benefit 
curve .    Therefore, if we include the benefit of car navigation system, three curves 
indicated in 
MSB
Figure 4 will shift to the upside, without changing relative positional 
relation among them.    This shows the further necessity of tax imposition to realize the 
optimal  penetration  level.   
 










Figure 7      Combination of travel-time saving rate and tax/subsidy required to 
realize the optimal penetration level (2) 
 
These are the results of the simulation for the standard case.  With regard to 
comparative cases, Table 5 shows combinations of (α ,β ) for comparative cases, where 
the market penetration level coincides with the optimal penetration level.  Table 5 
indicates that, for example, in the comparative case 1, the market penetration level 
coincides with the optimal penetration level whenα =0.05 and β＝0.0433 and its level is 
30.02%.  In all cases, the market penetration level coincides with the optimal 
penetration level when  β  has a value similar toα .  Therefore, we can draw a same 
conclusion that the imposition of tax will be necessary to realize the optimal penetration 
level unless the value of β  is similar to the value of α (i.e., unless the negative 
network externality is weak).   
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Table 5    Combinations of (α ,β ) where the market penetration level coincides 
with the optimal penetration level（Comparative cases） 
Standard case 0.0414 (0.3074 ) 0.0900 (0.4331 ) 0.1393 (0.5059 ) 0.1888 (0.5554 )
Comparative case1 0.0433 (0.3002 ) 0.0909 (0.4259 ) 0.1389 (0.4993 ) 0.1873 (0.5494 )
Comparative case2 0.0383 (0.3203 ) 0.0892 (0.4416 ) 0.1398 (0.5119 ) 0.1902 (0.5600 )
Comparative case3 0.0364 (0.2696 ) 0.0836 (0.3663 ) 0.1321 (0.4223 ) 0.1811 (0.4609 )
Comparative case4 0.0448 (0.3573 ) 0.0927 (0.5018 ) 0.1415 (0.5801 ) 0.1907 (0.6310 )
Comparative case5 0.0393 (0.2565 ) 0.0858 (0.3535 ) 0.1334 (0.4106 ) 0.1815 (0.4503 )
Comparative case6 0.0459 (0.3538 ) 0.0926 (0.4967 ) 0.1399 (0.5748 ) 0.1875 (0.6257 )
Comparative case7 0.0323 (0.2919 ) 0.0813 (0.3830 ) 0.1312 (0.4351 ) 0.1813 (0.4712 )
Comparative case8 0.0432 (0.3631 ) 0.0929 (0.5067 ) 0.1428 (0.5839 ) 0.1927 (0.6340 )
α=0.05 α=0.1 α=0.15 α=0.2
 
Note: It shows that in the comparative case 1, the market penetration level coincides 
with the optimal penetration level when  α  =0.05  and  β＝0.0433 and its level is 
30.02%. 
 
3.2.3 Dynamic  stability 
Now, let’s check the dynamic stability of the optimal penetration level.    Four curves 
in  Figure 8 show slopes of phase diagram at the optimal penetration level in 
combination with the value ofβ , in four cases where values of  α  are respectively set 
as 0.05, 0.10, 0.15 and 0.20 .  They have been derived by putting the optimal 
penetration level in    of the formula (12).   
e p
This figure shows whether the market penetration level converges to the optimal 
penetration level by the imposition of tax/subsidy when the expected penetration level is 
in the neighborhood of the optimal  penetration  level.   
In Figure 8, for all cases, slopes of topological map are larger than -1.    Therefore, 
when the expected penetration level is in the neighborhood of the optimal penetration 
level, the market penetration level will converge to the optimal penetration level.   













Figure 8    Combinations of travel-time saving rate and the dynamic stability of 
the optimal penetration level 
 
4.  Conclusion and challenges   
In this paper, we first classified benefits of using VICS and showed that VICS unit is 
a good with network externality.  There are two patterns for its sign of externality; it 
can be negative or change from positive to negative. 
We then developed a simulation model and actually measured the optimal penetration 
level of VICS and the level of tax/subsidy required to realize that level.  The result 
showed that it would be highly necessary to impose a tax on VICS units in order to 
realize the optimal penetration level. 
We are to elaborate the measurement of the VICS benefit and its optimal penetration 
level.    In this simulation, we have chosen the travel-time saving benefit as the object of 
measurement.  However, as explained in 2.2.1 ‘Categories of benefits and their 
attributions’, other benefits, such as the travel-cost saving benefit, arise from VICS both 
for vehicles equipped with VICS unit and vehicles without VICS unit.  Likewise, in 
this simulation, we have employed the cost for purchasing the VICS unit as the cost.  
However, in order to discuss the optimal penetration level in comparison with this cost, 
we have to consider the benefit of the car navigation function. In addition, apart from 
benefits belonging to drivers, there are benefits for the whole society, which are the 
benefit of reducing air-pollution substances and the benefit of reducing emissions of 
carbon.  In the future, we need to elaborate the measurement in considering these 
points.  Especially for the measurement of the benefit of car navigation function, we 
need to carry out an inquiry survey to drivers and measures its value by Contingent 
Valuation method (CVM).     
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Notes 
                                                        
i  Levinson (2003) has studied and summarized  related  researches.   
ii As to travel-time saving by VICS, several driving experiments have been conducted 
in the past.  In the driving experiment conducted by Universal Traffic Management 
Society of Japan on February 1997 in the Tokyo metropolitan area (From 
Shinjyuku-Sancyome to Shiba-Gocyome) , it has been reported that travel-time for 
vehicles with VICS unit had been saved by 4.4%, compared to that of vehicles 
without VICS unit.（UTMS (1997)）Likewise, in the feasibility study on ITS Model 
Experiment Plan that ITS Japan started in 1997 , it has been reported that travel-time 
in Toyota-city (From Toyota-minami to Sakaemachi) has been saved by 20 % at 
maximum and 10% in daily average. 
iii The notion of network externality was first proposed in Libenstein(1950), as 
consumption externalities such as ‘bandwagon Effect’ (positive consumption 
externality) and ‘Snob Effect’ (negative consumption externality).  Later, it has been 
formulated as ‘A Theory of Interdependent Demand for a Communications service’ in 
Rohlfs(1974).   
iv ‘DID(Densely Inhabited Districts)’ and ‘other urban areas’ in “Road Traffic Census” by 
Ex-Road Bureau of Ministry of Construction.   
v Japan Automobile Manufacturers Association, Inc. (2003), “ Passenger Car Market 
Trends (March 2004)” 
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p
vi Calculated based on Ex-Road Bureau of Ministry of Construction(1999), “Road 
Traffic Census”   
vii Ex-Road Bureau of Ministry of Construction (1999), “Road Traffic Census” Chart 
2-1  
viii ‘Yearly Average of Monthly Receipts and Disbursements per Household in Fiscal 
Year -All Japan-‘ in Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (2003) , “Annual 
report on the family income and expenditure survey” 
ix  Calculated from the average monthly working hours in establishments with 5 or more 
employees, in Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare,”Annual Report on the Monthly 
Labour Survey”   
x  Japan Automobile Manufacturers Association, Inc. (2002),”Small/Mini Truck Market 
Trends (March 2003 )”and (2002) “Standard Truck Market Trends (March 2003) “ 
xi City and Regional Development Department, Road Bureau, Ministry of Land, 
Infrastructure and Transport, Japan, “Draft for ‘Cost-Benefit Analysis Manual’”, August 
2003 
xii As we can understand from the development of formula described later, the number 
of vehicles does not affect on the marginal value of the benefit.   
xiii It shows the average tenure of use of automobiles. “Trend of Japanese People ’s 
Possession of Automobiles 2004”, Association Automobile inspection & registration 
Association,  
xiv  These curves were drawn by deriving values on the vertical axis for 80 values of , 
whose values on the horizontal axis varying from the minimum value of 0.005 to the 
maximum value of 0.4, with an interval of 0.005 and by connecting such points with a 
straight line.   
xv At this penetration level, penetration levels for each type of vehicle are as follows; 
passenger vehicles 23.13%, mini trucks 32.76%, small trucks 50.48% and standard 
trucks 100%.  The percentage of the benefit for vehicles equipped with VICS unit in 
the total social benefit is 81.0%, while the benefit commonly enjoyed by vehicles with 
VICS unit and vehicles without VICS unit is 19%.   
xvi This value of α  has been set based on the result on previous works on the 
penetration level of traffic information and the level of travel-time saving.   
xvii We have calculated the optimal penetration level and the market penetration level 
for 6 patterns of (α ,β) ((0.05, 0.02), (0.05, 0.025), (0.05, 0.030), (0.05, 0.035), (0.05, 
0.040), (0.05, 0.045) and showed diagrammatically by connecting such points with a 
straight line.  For the case where α =0.10, we have calculated market penetration 
levels for 16 values of β varying from the minimum value of 0.02 to the maximum 
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value of 0.095, with an interval of 0.005 and showed diagrammatically by connecting 
such points with a straight line.  Likewise, for cases where α =0.15 and  α =0.20, we 
have calculated market penetration levels respectively for 26 values of β varying from 
the minimum value of 0.02 to the maximum value of 0.145 and for 36 values of β 
varying from the minimum value of 0.02 to the maximum value of 0.195 and showed 
diagrammatically by connecting such points with straight lines. Figure 6 and Figure 8 
are diagramatic representations where values are calculated in the same combinations of 
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